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Abstract. Three sequential models of consumption economies are considered,
where consumers’ only endowment is money. The existence and unicity of
temporary equilibria, the neutrality of money and the validity of quantity
theory are investigated. In the …rst two models ”money” is perishable; in the
second one lending between consumers is possible. In the third model money
is an asset and can be created through bank loans.
1. Introduction
Exchange economies are an idealization where production is so bracketed that
commodities fall like manna from heaven. In this paper we attempt a di¤erent
sort of idealization: production is certainly bracketed, but the essential bipolarity
between consumers and producers in a modern economy is emphasized, although
still centring on one of the poles. On this pole, consumers’ needs are satis…ed with
goods, producers’ needs with money. Speci…cally, at the beginning of the week’s
market, consumers have money, and producers have goods, and ”every man lives
by exchanging”, in the words of Adam Smith [9]. We do not consider here the
very relevant question of why we have come to this institutional framework (v.,
e.g., [3], [4] and [7] for answers to this kind of question), but what is certain is
that we have come to it. As in cash-in-advance models (…rst proposed by [1]), here
the medium of exchange role of money is not endogenously determined, but it is
imposed institutionally (v., e.g., [6] and [10] among the many contributions in this
direction).
Consumers face some social entity that holds the (perishable) commodities, and
supply them against the deliverance of money. Beyond that, this entity might
be interpreted as the supply edge of ”the productive sector”. We consider three
models, according to the increasing freedom that consumers have not to spend their
money or spend more than they own. In the …rst model, they have none of these
liberties. In the second one, they have access to them individually, but not in the
aggregate: lending between consumers is possible, but money is perishable and new
money cannot be created at the request of consumers. In the third model these
freedoms exist also in the aggregate: money is no longer perishable (so consumers
are allowed not to spend it and so to keep it for the future) and can be created
through bank loans to consumers (so they are allowed to spend more than they
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have). The idea of ”perishable money” appearing in the …rst two models may seem
a contradiction in terms; the reader can always solve this problem by changing the
term and calling this dismal money ”pseudomoney”.
Each model is de…ned in a sequential framework by some structural hypotheses,
upon which further assumptions are introduced in the statements of the results.
These assumptions are de…ned on aggregate demands and incorporate the e¤ect
of expectations. The stability of any monetary system supposes some restraint in
the way expectations are built up. However strong the real economy is or wise the
policies are, any system will collapse if the economic agents come to believe that
money will be worthless tomorrow.
We consider only the short run and discuss temporary competitive equilibria
([2] and [5]). The issue of grounding microeconomically the assumptions about
aggregate demands is not tackled.
Given two vectors x;y 2 Rq; x · y means xi · yi for i = 1;:::;q, and x < y
means xi < yi for i = 1;:::;q; the scalar product of the two vectors is denoted by
hx;yi. We write R
q
+ , fx 2 Rq : x ¸ 0g and R
q
++ , fx 2 Rq : x > 0g.
2. The simplest model
We consider a sequential exchange economy where l perishable commodities are
traded and consumed by n agents in each period t, where t = 1;2;:::
Consider the situation in period t. The consumption set for all the consumers
is Rl
+, the society has et
i > 0 units of commodity i at its disposal, et , (et
1;:::;et
l),
and at the beginning of the period consumer j receives an allowance of mt
j ¸ 0






j. The consumer’s money consists
of a credit balance in his account in the (central) bank. Money is ”perishable”: it is
dated, and after its period is not accepted in the market. Given commodity prices
pt = (pt
1;:::;pt
l), the consumer’s budget set is de…ned by
©
x 2 Rl




Thus consumers have in front of them a …xed stock of (di¤erent sorts of) manna,
to be distributed according to a method: they have to pay for it with the money
that they possess.
As in this paper almost every symbol has the superscript t referring to the current
period, this superscript will be dropped after the symbol has been introduced for
the …rst time, except for emphasis.
Consumer j has a demand function ft
j : Rl
++ ! Rl
+ de…ned for all strictly
positive price1 vectors p. The consumer’s demand depends on mj; when we want
to re‡ect it explicitely in the notation we write ft
j(mj;p). We also consider the




j. Now ³ changes with m. If we …x the
proportions ºt
j , mt
j=Mt, j = 1;:::;l, then ³ changes only with M, which we re‡ect




+ : hp;xi = mj
ª
, for all p 2 Rl
++
(I.2) fj(¸mj;¸p) = fj(mj;p) , for all ¸ > 0;p 2 Rl
++
1Money is here assumed to be the unit of account, i.e., the price of money pt
0 is 1. This can
be always obtained by normalizing, provided that p0 > 0: At any rate, we are considering only
strictly positive prices, including that of money, hoping that equilibrium should exist in this range
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The hypotheses made so far de…ne our Model I. Some obvious consequences
follow. From (I.1), Walras’ law obtains:
hp;³(p)i = M; for all p 2 Rl
++ (1)
From (I.2), absence of money ilusion holds:
³(¸M;¸p) = ³(M;p); for all ¸ > 0;p 2 Rl
++ (2)
A price vector e pt > 0 such that ³t(e pt) = et is called an equilibrium price vector
(ft
j(e pt), j = 1;:::;n, are the corresponding equilibrium individual demands)2.
We attempt …rst some unicity result. Some price vector pk > 0, in period k (k <
t), is taken as a base for price indices; given a price vector pt > 0 we shall denote
by Pt the corresponding (Paasche) price index, i.e., Pt , hpt;³t(pt)i=hpk;³t(pt)i,
provided hpk;³t(pt)i > 0.
Proposition 2.1. Consider Model I, and let t 2 N. Then all equilibrium price
vectors (if any) have the same price index.
Proof. From Walras’ law, we have that he p;ei = M for any equilibrium price vector
e p. Hence e P = M=hpk;ei.
Thus, if there is some equilibrium, we can speak of the equilibrium price index.
Notice that it depends on M, although it does not depend on how M is partitioned
into the allowances mj; j = 1;:::;n.
In order to ensure the existence of equilibrium, we form macroeconomic hypothe-
ses. For the aggregate demand we may assume:
(I.3) ³(M;p) is continuous as a function of (M;p) 2 R
1+l
++
(I.4) limp!p k³(p)k ! +1, for all p ¸ 0 with pi = 0 for some i
Observe that, from (I.1) and (I.4), M > 0.
Proposition 2.2. Consider Model I and assume (I.3) and (I.4). Let t 2 N. Then
there is some equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Let z : R
1+l
++ ! R1+l be de…ned by z0(p0;p) , hp;ei=p0 ¡ M, zi(p0;p) ,
³i(p0M;p) ¡ ei for i = 1;:::;l ; here p0 can be interpreted as ”the price of money”.
Thus z is continuous and homogeneous of degree zero, and z(p0;p) ¸ (¡M;¡e) for
all (p0;p). Also h(p0;p);z(p0;p)i = p0(hp;ei=p0) ¡ p0M + hp;³(p0;p)i ¡ hp;ei = 0.
Moreover, if (p0;p) ¸ 0, (p0;p) 6= 0, and either pi = 0 for some i or p0 = 0, then
lim
(p0;p)!(p0;p)
kz(p0;p)k ! +1 (3)




since e > 0 and p 6= 0, and (3) also follows. From these properties of z, we conclude
(by a well known result; v., e.g., 17.C.1 in [8]) that there is (p¤
0;p¤) > 0 such that
z(p¤
0;p¤) = 0, and thus ³t(p¤
0M;p¤) = e; the result follows from (2) for e p , p¤=p¤
0.
In the following Proposition we consider the e¤ects of a change in the initial
quantity of money M. Redistribution e¤ects on the individual allowances can be
or not excluded. Observe that (i) holds irrespective of how ¸M is partitioned into
the allowances of the consumers.
2This equilibrium does not guarantee that all consumers receive the necessities of life.4 J.M. GUTIÉRREZ
Proposition 2.3. Consider Model I and assume (I.3) and (I.4). Let t 2 N. Sup-
pose that the quantity of money changes from M to ¸M (with ¸ > 0), within the
same hypotheses. Then:
(i) The equilibrium price index for ¸M is that for M multiplied by ¸.
(ii) If all individual allowances change also in the same scale from mj to ¸mj,
then the equilibrium price vectors for ¸M are those for M multiplied by ¸, and the
corresponding equilibrium individual demands do not change.
Proof. (i) Let P be the equilibrium price index for ¸M and e P that for M. Then
P = ¸M=hpk;ei = ¸e P .
(ii) From (2) and (I.2),
³(¸M;p) = ³(M;p=¸); for all p 2 Rl
++
fj(¸mj;p) = fj(mj;p=¸); for all p 2 Rl
++;j = 1;:::;n
and the result follows.
Therefore, if the quantity of money changes by a factor of ¸, then the price index
changes by the same factor. If in addition the proportions are kept in the allowances
of the consumers (the Ricardian case), then money is neutral (real magnitudes stay
unchanged), and quantity theory holds ( the other nominal magnitudes (i.e., prices)
are also multiplied by ¸).
The reader will have found the superscript indicating the period t not only
cumbersome, but also useless. In Model I it is indeed useless: each period is a
”world apart”. But at least the patient reader has ‡exed his superscript muscles in
preparation for the following models.
3. Trusting the neighbour
We again consider a sequential exchange economy where l perishable commodi-
ties are traded and consumed by n agents in each period t, where t = 1;2;::: Money
is perishable, as above, but now money-denominated private loans (i.e., between
consumers) allow purchasing power to be transferred between periods.
In every period t, again, Rl
+ is the consumption set for all the consumers, the
society has et
i > 0 units of commodity i at its disposal, and at the beginning of the
period consumer j receives an allowance of mt
j ¸ 0 units of perishable money (which




j. We suppose that Mt > 0. As one-period
private loans are now possible, he borrows (positive sign) or lends (negative sign)
bt
j monetary units from/to the other consumers. He also pays back or cashes the
loans bt¡1




j = 0), plus the interest





available units of money.
Given a rate of interest rt and commodity prices pt in period t, consumer j
makes estimations about the future3 and has to decide the amount he borrows
(lends) and the commodity bundle in the current period. There are two markets:
3The past is supposed to be known, and the present is either known since the beginning of the
period (so mt
j), or represented through the parameters rt;pt.MONEY IN CONSUMPTION ECONOMIES 5
that for loans4 and that for commodities. Notice that in the loans market the
quantity of tradeable items is not given as a datum (loans are issued by the very
consumers), as it is in the commodities market. The preferences of the consumer
are given by a function ht
j : ]¡1;+1[ £ Rl
++ ! R £ R
l
+ de…ned for pairs (r;p),
where ht
j1(r;p) represents the desired borrowing (lending) and ht
j2(r;p) the desired
commodity bundle when the constraint on the present budget (no longer given as
a datum, like in Model I) is that determined by (r;p) (v. below). We assume
that mj ¡ (1 + rt¡1)b
t¡1
j + hj1(r;p) ¸ 0. Obviously, predictions a¤ect preferences;
implicit in ht
j(r;p) is the fact that, for periods t+u, with u > 0, consumer j predicts
the vector of prices b pu
j, the rate of interest b ru
j and his allowance b mu
j.
We suppose that the desired borrowing (lending) depends on commodity prices
only through the corresponding price index. Formally, some price vector pk > 0, in
period k (k < t), is …xed as a base for price indices; given a price vector pt > 0 we




j : ]¡1;+1[ £ R++ ! R. The aggregate excess





On the other hand, we suppose that the desired commodity bundle in the current
period depends on the rate of interest only through the resulting planned borrowing,
and also that the distribution according to sources of the available money at
j (as
allowance, borrowing or settlement of past lending) does not a¤ect the preferred




aj ¸ 0, such that ht
j2(r;p) = ft





j ¸ 0 (not explicitely re‡ected in the notation, but they must be clear




j = 1, and given A > 0, then the function ³t(A;:) : Rl
++ !
Rl










+ : hp;xi = aj
ª
, for all aj ¸ 0;p 2 Rl
++
(II.2) fj(¸aj;¸p) = fj(aj;p) , for all aj ¸ 0;¸ > 0;p 2 Rl
++
The hypotheses made so far in this section de…ne our Model II. In this model,










hp;fj(mj ¡ (1 + rt¡1)b
t¡1
j + ¯j(r;P);p)i, and the result
follows from (II.1).
41=(1 + rt) is the price of a unit of loan (i.e., a promise of payment in period (t + 1) of 1
monetary unit). Notice that the possibility of default is excluded, and this supposes moderation
and prudence on the part of borrowers. In fact, lenders are likely to help borrowers to be virtuous,
and borrowers are to acknowledge this help up to the point of incorporating as second nature the
lenders’ solvency conditions in their preferences.
5The analogy between (I.1) and (II.1) (with mj replaced by aj) should not be overstretched:
(I.1) holds, in principle, for a particular mj, whereas (II.1) holds for any aj ¸ 0. Notice that
Proposition 3.3 would still be satis…ed if (II.1) held only for aj , e aj, with e aj as de…ned below.6 J.M. GUTIÉRREZ
A pair (e rt; e pt) 2 ]¡1;+1[ £ Rl




j(e rt; e pt) =
(0;e).
The following result is similar to Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 3.1. Consider Model II, and let t 2 N. Then all equilibrium pairs (if any)
have the same (commodity) price index.
Proof. If (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair, then z(e r; e P) = 0 and µ(e r; e p) = e. Hence,
from Walras’ law (4), e P = M=hpk;ei.
From the proof of Lemma 3.1, our only possible candidate for equilibrium price
index is ¼t , Mt=hpk;eti. We may consider assumptions on z:
(II.3) z(r;¼) is continuous and strictly decreasing as a function of r 2 ]¡1;+1[
(II.4) There exist rt;rt 2 ]¡1;+1[ such that z(rt;¼) ¸ 0, z(rt;¼) · 0
From (II.3) and (II.4), by the intermediate value theorem, there exists6 one, and
only one, e rt 2 ]¡1;+1[ such that z(e rt;¼) = 0. The (sort of) unicity result for
Model II is now immediate from Lemma 3.1.
Proposition 3.2. Consider Model II and assume (II.3) and (II.4). Let t 2 N.
Then all equilibrium pairs (if any) have the same interest rate and (commodity)
price index.









e aj = M. In (II.5) and (II.6), the
proportions ºj , e aj=M, j = 1;:::;l are to be taken to de…ne ³(A;:).
(II.5) ³(A;p) is continuous as a function of (A;p) 2 R1+l
++
(II.6) limp!p k³(M;p)k ! +1, for all p ¸ 0 with pi = 0 for some i
Proposition 3.3. Consider Model II and assume (II.3)-(II.6). Let t 2 N. Then
there is some equilibrium pair.









fj(e aj; e p) = e. Further, from (1), he p;ei = M, and thus e P = ¼. We can
conclude that (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair:
n X
j=1
hj1(e r; e p) = z(e r;¼) = 0
n X
j=1
hj2(e r; e p) =
n X
j=1
fj(e aj; e p) = e
As in Model I, the equilibrium price index depends on M (and does not depend
on the mj), and also in a linear way:
6Obviously, for the mere existence it would be su¢cient to assume the condition of (II.3) for
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Proposition 3.4. Consider Model II and assume (II.3)-(II.6). Let t 2 N. Suppose
that the quantity of money changes from M to ¸M (with ¸ > 0), within the same
hypotheses. Then the equilibrium price index for ¸M is that for M multiplied by ¸.
In contrast with Model I, if all individual allowances mj (and not only the quan-
tity of money M) change by the same factor ¸ , then the equilibrium (commodity)
price vectors are not necessarily multiplied by ¸ (and the new corresponding equi-
librium individual demands may be altered). In fact, the settlement of past loans
term (1+rt¡1)bt¡1
j does not change, and this means a redistribution of purchasing
power among consumers when allowances and prices move in the same scale7.
We conclude that quantity theory (as it is usually de…ned) holds: if the quantity
of money is multiplied by ¸, so it is the price index. On the other hand, money is
not neutral, at least exactly.
4. A touch of immortality
We consider now two substantial changes in the last model (whose notation we
keep in the sequel, unless otherwise stated). Firstly, money is now nonperishable:
if consumer j does not spend some amount dt
j at period t, it stays as a deposit
in the bank, yielding interest at the beginning of period (t + 1) at rate ½t, the
(bank) deposit rate. Secondly, the bank can grant loans; it makes so by creating
new money. At period t, the consumer can contract a money-denominated credit
ct
j with the bank at rate of interest ½t, the (bank) credit rate. Private loans (i.e.,













available units of money to spend.
In contrast to Model I and Model II, now the authorities have instruments of pol-
icy. We assume that the bank can set ½t and ½t, with ½t · ½t, and the Government
can determine Mt. In both cases there are constraints: ½t ¸ 0 and Mt ¸ Mt
0, where
Mt
0 ¸ 0 is a threshold already known when period t begins8. The …rst constraint is
imposed by the technology of money, the second one by the realities of governance.
We denote V t , fx 2 R : x ¸ Mt
0g and W ,
©
(x1;x2) 2 R2




j=Mt, j = 1;:::;l, depend on Mt, i.e., there are functions gt
j : V t ! R+,
j = 1;:::;l, such that mt
j = gt
j(Mt). Unless otherwise speci…ed, (½;½) 2 W and
M 2 V are …xed in the sequel.
The bank imposes no rationing in its deposit and credit facilities. We suppose
that r 2 [½;½], i.e., consumers prefer to contract with the bank if the latter o¤ers a
better deal (rate of interest) than fellow consumers.


















j, we have that St = Dt ¡ Ct. After settling the contracts of period
(t ¡ 1), the aggregated amount of money held by consumers at the start of period
7Even if this e¤ect could be overlooked, hardly anything has been assumed on the functions
¯j, and on the way in which they incorporate expectations.
8Further constraints might be imposed, v.g., perhaps there is some & ¸ 0 such that it must
hold that ½ ¡ ½ ¸ &.8 J.M. GUTIÉRREZ
t is Nt , Mt + (1 + ½t¡1)Dt¡1 ¡ (1 + ½t¡1)Ct¡1; within period t, Ct new money
is to be created, and Dt is to be kept away from the commodity market.
In period t, given a rate of interest (for private loans) rt and commodity prices
pt, consumer j makes estimations about the future and has to decide: how much he
deposits in the bank, how much he borrows from the bank, the amount he borrows
(lends) privately and the commodity bundle in the current period. There are four
markets: for deposits, credits9, private loans and commodities. The preferences of
the consumer are given by a function ht
j : [½;½]£Rl
++ ! R+£R+£R £ R
l
+ de…ned
for pairs (r;p), where ht
j1(r;p) represents the desired bank deposits, ht
j2(r;p) the
desired borrowing from the bank10, ht
j3(r;p) the desired private borrowing (lend-
ing), and ht
j4(r;p) the desired commodity bundle when the constraint on the present
budget is that determined by (r;p). We assume that mt
j ¡ (1 + rt¡1)b
t¡1
j ¡ (1 +
½t¡1)c
t¡1






We suppose that hj1, hj2 and hj3 depend on commodity prices only through the
corresponding price index. Formally: ht
j1(r;p) = ±t
j(r;P), where ±t

















j, respectively, and the aggregate excess demand for









+, for aj ¸ 0, such that ht
j4(r;p) = ft
j(mj ¡ (1 + rt¡1)b
t¡1
























+ : hp;xi = aj
ª
, for all aj ¸ 0;p 2 Rl
++
(III.2) fj(¸aj;¸p) = fj(aj;p), for all aj ¸ 0;¸ > 0;p 2 Rl
++
The hypotheses made so far in this section de…ne our Model III. A kind of Walras’





hp;µ(r;p)i = N + z(r;P) + K(r;P) ¡ ¢(r;P), for all (r;p) 2 [½;½] £ Rl
++ (5)
A pair (e rt; e pt) 2 [½;½]£Rl
++ is called an equilibrium pair if
n P
j=1
hj3(e rt; e pt) = 0 and
n P
j=1
hj4(e rt; e pt) = e. Observe that nothing is required here for the deposits market
and the credit market, where demand is always met by supply.
9Since the prices in the markets for deposits and credits (i.e., ½ and ½) are …xed, the adjustment
is through the supply: we recall that in both markets the bank imposes no rationing. The
consumers can deposit and borrow as much as they want. Just as for private loans, the possibility
of default is excluded; cf footnote4 .
10Notice the presence of r as an argument in the demand for bank credit function hj2(r;p)
and the demand for deposits function hj1(r;p), as private borrowing (lending) is an alternative to
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Two assumptions on z may be made11, like in Model II, but now there is no
such an impervious candidate for equilibrium price index as then.
(III.3) z(r;P) is continuous and strictly decreasing as a function of r 2 [½;½],
for all P 2 R++
(III.4) z(½;P) ¸ 0;z(½;P) · 0, for all P 2 R++
From (III.3) and (III.4), for every Pt 2 R++ there exists a unique e rt
Pt 2 [½;½]
such that z(e rt
Pt;Pt) = 0. We consider the aggregate deposits and the aggregate
bank credit when there is equilibrium in the private loans market, ±t : R++ ! R+
and ·t : R++ ! R+, de…ned by ±t(P) , ¢t(e rt
P;P) and ·t(P) , Kt(e rt
P;P), re-
spectively; both are functions of the price level. Also, when there is equilibrium
in the private loans market, ¹t , Nt + ·t represents the aggregate quantity of
money, ¾t , ±t ¡ ·t the aggregate saving and Ãt , Nt ¡ ¾t the aggregate ex-
penditure. Notice that Ãt(P) ¸ 0 for all P 2 R++. For simplicity, we call ¹ the
(aggregate) quantity of money function, ¾ the (aggregate) saving function and
Ã the (aggregate) demand function.
With the above assumptions, the equilibrium (commodity) price indices (if there
is some equilibrium) must be …xed points of a real function12, namely ´t : R++ !
R+ de…ned by ´t(P) , Ãt(P))=hpk;ei.
Proposition 4.1. Consider Model III and assume (III.3) and (III.4). Let t 2 N.
If (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair, then e P is a …xed point of ´ and e r = e re P.
Proof. If (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair, then z(e r; e P) = 0 (thus e r e P = e r) and µ(e r; e p) =
e. Hence, from Walras’ law (5), he p;ei = N ¡ ¾(e P), and therefore ´(e P) = e P.
We may consider now assumptions on ³:
(III.5) ³(º;A;p) is continuous as a function of (A;p) 2 R1+l
++, for all º 2 U
(III.6) limp!p k³(º;A;p)k ! +1, for all º 2 U, A > 0 and p ¸ 0 with pi = 0
for some i
The last two assumptions make possible to turn the statement of Proposition
4.1 into a characterization.
Lemma 4.2. Consider Model III and assume (III.3)-(III.6). Let t 2 N. Then
(e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair if, and only if, e P is a …xed point of ´ and e r = e r e P.
Proof. One implication is Proposition 4.1. Conversely, suppose that e P is a …xed
point of ´ and e r = e r e P. Obviously, z(e r; e P) = 0. We denote e bj , ¯j(e r; e P), e cj ,







e bj + e cj ¡ e dj. Observe that
n P
j=1
e aj = N + K(e r; e P) ¡ ¢(e r; e P) = Ã(e P). Also, taking
r , e r and (e.g.) p , e Ppk in (5), we have that Ã(e P) > 0. The assumptions of Model
I are again satis…ed, with e aj and Ã(e P) in place of mj and M. From Proposition 2.2,
11Some comment on (III.4) is in order. Private lenders (borrowers) compete with bank deposits
(credits) for the favour of consumers. It seems realistic to suppose that, the rate of interest being
equal, the bank tends to conquer, if only because consumers wish to save shoe leather. Hence,
more often than not, ¯j(½;P) ¸ 0 and ¯j(½;P) · 0.
12Even without requiring (III.3) and (III.4), if (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair, then (e r; e P) is a …xed
point of a certain real function of two real variables. This is clear from the proof of Proposition
4.1.10 J.M. GUTIÉRREZ




fj(e aj;p) = e. Further, from (1), hp;ei = Ã(e P),
and thus P = ´(e P) = e P. We can deduce that (e r;p) is an equilibrium pair:
n X
j=1






fj(e aj;p) = e
In order to obtain the existence of equilibrium, it is now only natural to make
further assumptions on ´ (or, what is the same, on either ¾ or Ã). Notice that
Model III and assumptions (III.3)-(III.6) depend on certain …xed (½t;½t) 2 W
and Mt 2 V t; we are now going to hypothesize them for any (½t;½t) 2 W and
Mt 2 V t. When we want to re‡ect explicitely that ¾ changes with M and (½;½),





. The main point of the following assumption is that
aggregate dissaving can be made smaller than any positive number by using the
bank rates, whatever the price level is.
(III.7) There exists Mt
1 2 V t satisfying: for every P > cMt
1 and " > 0, there
exists (½;½) 2 W such that ¾(Mt
1;½;½;P) ¸ ¡"
The possibility of using the bank rates in an expansional policy has a limit: they
must be nonnegative. However, if (III.8) below is assumed (where M1 is as de…ned
in (III.7)), an aggregate demand as large as required is obtained by levering M.
(III.8) For every P > cM1 and À > 0, there exist M 2 V;(½;½) 2 W such that
Ã(M;½;½;P) ¸ À
A continuity assumption suggests itself in the way to reaching equilibrium (again
M1 is as de…ned in (III.7)).
(III.9) Ã(M;½;½;P) is continuous as a function of (M;(½;½)) 2 V £ W, for all
P > cM1
In the next result, any price index larger than cM1 is compatible with the exis-
tence of equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3. Let Model III and (III.3)-(III.6) hold for any (½;½) 2 W and
M 2 V , and assume (III.7)-(III.9). Let t 2 N. Then, for all P > cM1, there are
f M 2 V and (e ½;e ½) 2 W for which there is some equilibrium pair with (commodity)
price index P.
Proof. Let P > cM1. From (III.7),
9(½
1;½1) 2 W such that ¾(M1;½
1;½1;P) ¸ N1 ¡ hpk;eiP
where clearly N1 , M1 + (1 + ½t¡1)Dt¡1 ¡ (1 + ½t¡1)Ct¡1. By (III.8),
9(M2;(½
2;½2)) 2 V £ W such that Ã(M2;½
2;½2;P) ¸ hpk;eiP
Hence ´(M1;½
1;½1;P) · P and ´(M2;½
2;½2;P) ¸ P. Since V £ W is connected,
it follows from (III.9) that there exists (f M;(e ½;e ½)) 2 V £ W such that P is a …xed
point of ´(f M;e ½;e ½;:). Applying Lemma 4.2, (e r; e p) is an equilibrium pair, where
e r , e rP and e p , Ppk.MONEY IN CONSUMPTION ECONOMIES 11
A contentious issue is whether the descent of prices can be able to overcome a
contractionary shock on demand. In order to obtain the existence of equilibrium
(this time not necessarily compatible with every price index larger than cM), an
alternative to (III.7)-(III.9) is to keep M …xed and replace (III.8) by
(III.8’) For every À > 0 there exist (½;½) 2 W;P > 0 such that Ã(½;½;P)=P ¸ À
Then (III.7) and (III.9) should also be altered in the obvious way:
(III.7’) For every " > 0 there exist (½;½) 2 W;P > cM such that ¾(½;½;P) ¸ ¡"
(III.9’) Ã(½;½;P) is continuous as a function of ((½;½);P) 2 W £ R++
The proof of Proposition 4.4 is similar to that of Proposition 4.3. Recall that
now M is again …xed.
Proposition 4.4. Let Model III and (III.3)-(III.6) hold for any (½;½) 2 W, and
assume (III.7’)-(III.9’). Let t 2 N. Then there is (e ½;e ½) 2 W for which there is
some equilibrium pair.
In Model III (assuming also (III.3) and (III.4), the aggregate quantity of money
and the aggregate demand are endogenously determined. From Proposition 4.1, any
equilibrium price index (if it exists) is proportional to the corresponding aggregate
demand (the proportionality factor is 1=hpk;ei). In order that the quantity theory
may hold, the permanence of deposits as a constant fraction of the quantity of
money (under the change of the latter) has to be hypothesized.
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